





This paper defends some of the central claims in The Ends of Harm: The 
Moral Foundations of Criminal Law against challenges by Eric Blumenson. 
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INTRODUCTION
I am very grateful to Eric Blumenson for his thoughtful, insightful and 
wide-ranging essay engaging with my book The Ends of Harm: The Moral 
Foundations of Criminal Law (hereafter, Ends). Blumenson makes many 
points which he thinks count against the Duty View of punishment (DV) 
that I defend in Ends which need careful thought. I won’t attempt to address 
all of his concerns. I will focus on those objections which I think he finds 
more telling, and where I have said less to defend the view outlined in Ends.1
Before continuing, let me clarify one feature of the general moral and 
political view outlined in Ends that Blumenson brief ly engages with. 
Blumenson suggests that the account of the means principle in ends is so 
strict and wide ranging that it implies a form of libertarianism akin to that 
defended by Robert Nozick in Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Nozick 1974). I 
would like to clarify the similarities and differences between my approach 
and Nozick’s. 
I have some sympathy with Nozick’s general methodological approach 
to political theory. Like Nozick, I think that the duties and constraints on 
state action are to be defended in the light of a more basic set of moral 
principles that govern individual interactions with each other. The state, 
and the principles that govern it are not, I think, sui generis. Nozick’s account 
is more directly reliant on a set of rights than that defended in Ends. 
Nevertheless, otherwise there is a broad similarity between us with respect 
to methodology. 
1  I have responded to some points that are similar to those advanced by Blumenson 
in Tadros 2012, 2013 and 2015.
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Furthermore, like Nozick, I think that there is a constraint on compelling 
some people to provide for others – the constraint on using some as a means 
to the good of others. Where Nozick and I differ, though, is in our understanding 
of the content of these rights and duties. Nozick was much more skeptical 
than I am about enforceable positive duties, and this feature of his moral 
theory is central to his defence of libertarianism.2 In contrast, I believe that 
there are enforceable positive duties. The scope and stringency of these duties 
may depend on a number of factors, including the extent to which people 
are mutually engaged in cooperative beneficial activities. I do not provide 
a full account of the scope and source of positive duties in Ends – I leave that 
as an open question, even though it has implications for criminal justice. 
Nevertheless, my account of the means principle emphasizes the limits of that 
principle in a way that Nozick’s account does not. 
This provides the possibility of broad ranging social provision and 
development aid, depending on the scope of domestic and international 
moral obligations. My own view is that positive enforceable duties are 
quite extensive, and hence I believe that we have powerful obligations of 
these kinds that can be enforced by the state.3 This also helps to address 
one of Blumenson’s concerns – he thinks that relying on the ‘duty of easy 
rescue’ to secure the permission of the state to punish offenders is inadequate 
because individuals do not have a very powerful duty to transfer their 
compensatory rights to the state to ensure that other people are protected 
from offending. I doubt that this is right. This is so in part because victims 
of crime are provided with substantial benefits from a system of punishment. 
Requiring them to allow the state to have control over their punitive rights 
is not typically onerous (on the contrary) and any cost that they bear as a 
result is more than compensated for by the benefits they are provided with.
Blumenson also complains that funding health care and occupational 
safety would, on this view, depend on the existence of duties to provide these 
things through the state. But it is highly plausible that the provision of these 
things does depend on such duties – when we fail to provide adequate health 
care or occupational safety, or for that matter adequate security from crime, 
we fail to do what justice requires, and hence we fail to satisfy our duties to 
others. When we provide health care beyond these limits, the appropriate 
complaint does seem to be that citizens do not owe this level of health care 
to each other. If the state fails to demonstrate that we owe some level of 
health care to each other, it has failed to justify that level of health care.
2  Nozick 1974, especially 30-3.
3  See, also, Tadros 2011b.
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I think, therefore, that the provision of social justice depends on citizens 
underlying duties to each other. This is not a libertarian view, at least if 
libertarians are committed (as Nozick was) to the non-existence of general 
enforceable positive duties. 
1. METHODOLOGY
Blumenson thinks that the fact that there are many duties, with uncertain 
scope, involved in DV provides some reason to reject that view. This is not 
a reason to reject DV. If these duties exist, we ought to try to fulfill them. 
It may be that we are likely to fulfill them only approximately, but that fact 
does not free us from these duties. In any individual life, many of us are 
confronted with a wide range of duties, some of which are in conflict with 
others. We have many complex duties as parents, children, professionals, 
friends, and simply as human beings, and it is often difficult to know whether 
we have fulfilled these duties. We are likely to do so only approximately at 
best. This fact hardly frees us of these duties, or makes them irrelevant to the 
way we live our lives.
Blumenson also thinks that the fact that DV has many steps should 
incline us against it. The success of the argument for each step, he suggests, 
is necessary for the success of DV. Even if we have a great deal of confidence 
in each step in the argument, our confidence in the conclusion should be 
limited if there are many steps in the argument. 
Unfortunately, Blumenson’s argument would rule out being persuaded 
by any philosophical argument that relies on many steps, even where we 
have very powerful reasons to endorse every step in the argument. It is difficult 
to accept this conclusion. Furthermore, any particular moral claim relies 
on the truth of many other controversial claims – for example claims about 
moral claims. Blumenson’s argument would thus lead to more general 
skepticism about all particular moral claims. 
Finally, Blumenson’s argument makes philosophical argumentation too 
easy. Consider the truth or falsity of act utilitarianism. Act uilitarianism is false 
if any non-act-utilitarian claim is true. There are many non-act-utilitarian 
claims. Even if we have very low levels of confidence in any particular claim, 
Blumenson’s view implies that we ought not to endorse act utilitarianism in 
virtue of the fact that there is some relatively high probability that one of these 
claims is true. I take it that this argument against act utilitarianism is not 
valid – to show that we ought not to accept act utilitarianism, we ought to 
demonstrate that we have confidence in some particular claim that is in 
conflict with act utilitarianism.
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It is also worth noting that some of the steps in the argument provided 
in Ends are not necessary to justify punishment generally – they justify 
punishment of particular people for particular purposes. For example, I 
defend the view that it is sometimes permissible to harm a person as a 
means to avert threats to people other than their immediate victims, even 
when they are not responsible for posing these threats. If the argument for 
this claim fails, punishment may still be justified in many cases. It will be 
justified in cases where offenders, through their offending, create threats 
to others. This will sometimes be so, because by offending they may undermine 
the effectiveness of the criminal law. It will also be justified in cases where 
punishing the offender helps to protect the victim from future offending. I 
don’t find these limits on punishment plausible, and I argued for a more 
expansive view. But the question under consideration is not about whether 
we should accept DV, but rather about what version of DV we should accept.
2. BLUMENSON’S ALTERNATIVE
As punishment is difficult to justify, we should not be surprised that an 
argument for punishment has many steps to it. Take Blumenson’s justification 
of punishment. One idea amongst many controversial ideas that Blumenson 
relies on, in defending his negative retributivism, is that punishment of the 
innocent is ruled out by something like the following principle:
Negative Desert: It is permissible to use D as a means to the good iff 
D deserves to be used, and in virtue of this fact.
Negative Desert is not a very clear principle. We need to know what desert 
means, and there are many possibilities. We also need to know what it means 
to deserve something ‘negatively’. I have some doubts that we can make good 
sense of negative desert in this sense. Like many friends of desert, I think 
that ‘X deserves O’ implies that there is good reason for X to get O irrespective 
of any further good that will be secured if X gets O. If so, there is no such 
thing as negative desert in Blumenson’s sense.
Negative Desert is not a coherent view, I claim, because it is a fact about 
desert, as I understand it, that if D deserves O, the value of giving O to D does 
not depend on any further value that giving O to D will secure instrumentally. 
Negative Desert is in conflict with this claim about desert. It makes the 
reason to give D O depend on something external to D getting O – that O is 
a means to some further good. Hence, it is not a view about desert, as I 
understand it. Perhaps Blumenson has a different conception of desert in 
mind in Negative Desert. Without an account of that conception, I continue 
to find Negative Desert confused.
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My suspicion that Blumenson’s view is confused was strengthened by his 
response to the incoherence objection. There Blumenson swithers between 
two different views. On the one hand, he seems to accept that desert implies 
that there is a positive reason to give D O, but a reason that can be outweighed. 
This view accepts that it is intrinsically valuable to give D what he deserves, 
but that this value can be outweighed. But this view is in conflict with 
Blumenson’s denial that retributivists are committed to the view that it is 
intrinsically valuable that offenders suffer the burdens of punishment. All 
sensible retributivists claim that the good of offenders getting what they 
deserve can be outweighed. So this view is just accepts positive desert, with 
all of its difficulties. 
Another view is the ‘rights forfeiture’ view. D, this view claims, loses his 
right against being punished in virtue of having acted wrongly. This view 
is not best seen as a form of retributivism at all. One reason is that rights 
forfeiture does not depend on desert.4 A second reason is that it is not clear 
how desert adds anything to a rights-forfeiture view. Rights-forfeiture views 
of punishment claim that punishment may permissibly be inflicted to serve 
certain ends on condition that a person has forfeited her right against such 
treatment. They then argue that a person forfeits her right against such 
treatment by acting wrongly. It would add nothing to such theories also to 
claim that wrongdoers deserve to lose these rights. The language of desert 
adds nothing substantial to rights-forfeiture theory – it is not even clear what 
it means to deserve to lose a right. 
DV is a version of a forfeiture view. So if, by negative desert, Blumenson 
simply means ‘rights forfeiture’, we are roughly in the same camp. But 
traditional rights-forfeiture views of punishment are superficial – the idea 
that wrongdoers lose rights is, of course, true on any justification of punishment. 
What needs explaining is why offenders lose their rights against being harmed 
as a means to the ends of punishment. Claiming that they have lost their rights 
to be used in this way is a conclusion that needs defending. 
The duty view offers a defence of this claim: it suggests that wrongdoers 
lose their rights against being used for the ends of punishemnt because they 
incur duties to serve these ends. I also claim that nothing, or almost nothing, 
else is sufficient – a person loses her right not to be used to serve an end, I 
claim, only if she has a duty to serve that end, or would have such a duty 
were she able to pursue it. Blumenson does not show that this view is false. 
If Blumenson wishes to defend a rights forfeiture view of punishment, he 
ought not to refer to desert. The idea that D has forfeited her right against 
being treated in a certain way does not depend on desert. If he rejects the 
4 See, for example, McMahan 2009: 8-9.
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kind of rights forfeiture view defended in Ends, he should supply an alternative 
explanation how wrongdoers lose their rights against being punished.
Furthermore, any convincing and complete account of rights-forfeiture 
will be controversial. A rights-forfeiture theorist needs both to provide an 
account of why people lose rights, and an account of the extent to which they 
lose rights. One reason why the argument in Ends is complex is that it attempts 
to make substantial progress with both questions. Simple rights-forfeiture 
views seem comparatively simple, but that is only because they avoid making 
progress with the difficult questions about why people lose rights, and the 
extent of the rights they lose. 
Let’s suppose that there is such a thing as negative desert. Let's suppose 
that there is such a thing as negative desert. Like DV Negative Desert relies 
on very controversial premises if it is to play the role in the justification of 
punishment that Blumenson wants it to play. Defending some particular 
account of desert against others will be controversial. This is obviously so 
as there are many different claims that friends of desert make about the 
nature of desert.5 Furthermore, any interpretation of Negative Desert is 
extremely controversial. Even if there is such a thing as negative desert, it is 
not uncontroversial that we can deserve to be used. It is not uncontroversial 
that anything like criminal wrongdoing is the desert basis for being used. 
And it is not uncontroversial – in fact it is clearly false - that it is only permissible 
to use a person as a means to the good only in virtue of the fact that the 
person deserves to be used. That this is clearly false is demonstrated by 
the fact that we can mount relatively uncontroversial arguments for the 
permissible using of others without relying on desert.
Negative Desert is by no means the most controversial element of 
Blumenson’s view, though. It relies on another claim: that the state has an 
obligation to punish wrongdoers even when this will produce no net social 
benefit ‘when this is obligatory in order to fulfill the state’s social contract 
obligations to the victim because no less draconian route is sufficient to do so’.
This element of Blumenson’s view also relies on many controversial claims, 
and so is vulnerable to Blumenson’s own argument. It relies on the success 
of following argument:
The state has social contract obligations to victims.
These social contract obligation that the state owes to the victim require 
the state not to ignore wrongdoing.
5 Even within the camp of the intrinsic goodness desert view, there is an enormous 
range of possibilities, many of which have gone unnoticed. For an exhausting, but perhaps 
not exhaustive, exploration of many of them, see Kagan 2012.
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If serious wrongdoing is not punished, the state ignores wrongdoing.
Therefore the state must punish serious wrongdoing.
This argument is even more controversial than Negative Desert. First, the 
social contract tradition is extremely controversial. I doubt that state 
obligations are grounded in social contract obligations. More importantly, 
it is not clear why the state, in failing to punish, necessarily ignores wrongdoing. 
There are many different non-punitive responses that the state might make to 
wrongdoing that would demonstrate that the state takes wrongdoing seriously. 
Given that punishing offenders is necessarily burdensome to the offender, 
but not necessarily burdensome to the state, it is also not clear why punishing 
offenders is sufficient to demonstrate that the state takes wrongdoing seriously. 
If I want to show that I take something seriously, it is I that should demonstrate 
a willingness to bear burdens for the sake of that thing. In punishing offenders, 
the state only demonstrates that it is willing to burden someone else – the 
offender. This may simply show that the state does not care much about the 
offender, not that it takes the wrongdoing seriously.
Furthermore, it is not clear that by refraining from punishing a person 
who has committed a serious wrong against the victim the state withdraws 
the status of citizens as valued members of the political community, as 
Blumenson claims. To demonstrate its commitment to the victim, the 
sensible thing to do is to help the victim. Punishing the offender may be one 
way to help the victim. The argument in Ends is intended to demonstrate 
that. But it is not the only way. The victim could be helped by being provided 
with extra protection by the state, or by being compensated in other ways. 
And the state could publicly express the importance of the victim, and 
educate its citizens about how terrible it was that the victim suffered in the 
way that she did. None of this requires punishing the offender. If the state 
does these things, is it really true that the state devalues the victim or 
denies his civic personhood?
So spelling out and defending Negative Retributivism requires an argument 
with many steps in it. As we have reason to doubt each of these steps (in my 
view, decisive reasons to reject some steps), Blumenson’s ‘diminishing returns’ 
argument, if successful, defeats his own view as well as mine.
Blumenson responds that an argument with multiple steps is more 
credible if its conclusion is independently intuitively attractive. He thinks 
that negative retributivism is intuitively more attractive than the duty 
view. I don’t find retributivism intuitively attractive. Blumenson’s version 
seems unclear. Negative retributivists can simply assert that those who we 
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intuitively think ought to be punished lack a right against being punished. 
But then the theory does little more than reporting our considered convictions 
about punishment rather than explaining them.
More standard retributivist views are also unclear, and seem barbaric. 
Few claims need more careful defence than the claim that it is impersonally 
valuable that wrongdoers suffer. Though some people believe this claim, it 
is not by itself intuitive – it rests on the idea that suffering and harm are 
sometimes to be sought for their inherent properties, and many recoil at 
this thought.
Furthermore, I don’t think that the explanation that DV gives for the 
permissibility of punishment is intuitively unattractive. First, the vast 
majority of people, when asked why we punish offenders, cite prevention 
as the aim. DV offers an argument why it is permissible, subject to certain 
constraints, to harm offenders to secure this aim. But the aim that DV 
advocates is familiar and attractive. Secondly, the idea that offenders may 
permissibly be used to secure this aim in virtue of their wrongdoing is 
attractive. DV then gives an answer to the familiar objection that offenders 
may not be used merely as a means to secure this aim – that offenders can 
be expected to serve the end of protection in virtue of having acted wrongly. 
This is the most original part of DV, but I don’t think that the response to 
the objection is itself unintuitive.
3. OTHER WAYS OF FULFILLING THE DUTY
DV relies on the idea that the permissibility of punishing offenders is 
grounded in the (primarily protective) duties that offenders incur as a 
result of their wrongdoing. Blumenson, in challenging Step 6 of his summary, 
argues that it is a weakness of DV that this would allow uneven punishment 
of offenders in cases where offenders have discharged the protective duties 
that they owe to their victims in other ways. I think that this implication of 
DV is one of its strengths. 
3.1. Who Gets to Decide
One question that Blumenson raises, that has also been raised by Kim 
Ferzan, is why the state should be in a position to decide how the duty that 
the offender owes to the victim is satisfied. 
Ferzan raised the following objection to DV. She argued that if the offender 
owes a duty to the victim, it is for the victim to determine what the offender 
does for her. If she wants protection, she can secure protection from him. If 
she wants her car washed, she can secure that end (Ferzan 2013). In response, I 
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argued that it would be wrong for the victim to impose any significant 
harm on the offender for the sake of her car. The offender can be harmed 
for the victim’s sake only if any harm imposed on him is proportionate to 
the end sought (Tadros 2013). 
Blumenson does not think that this obviates the problem that Ferzan 
raises. I do not see why. The first thing to note is that offenders obviously 
do owe very stringent duties to the victims of their wrongdoing. Blumenson’s 
challenge of explaining how these duties can best be fulfilled is thus quite 
general. If punishment does not vitiate these duties, offenders retain them. 
If Blumenson thinks that offenders retain these duties, how does he think 
they ought to be fulfilled? Does he think, for example, that after the offender 
is punished, the offender may nevertheless be seriously harmed again for 
the sake of the victim? 
Nevertheless, we should meet the challenge posed by Blumenson. Why 
does Blumenson doubt that DV can meet it? It is not completely clear, but 
perhaps Blumenson believes something like this: if D owes a duty to act for 
the sake of V at some cost n, V may impose n on D for any end whatsoever. 
This view, though, is not credible. It is not generally true of duties. For 
example, the fact that I have promised to deliver a television to your house 
implies that I must bear the cost of driving to your house. That, though, 
does not imply that you may impose on me the cost of driving to your 
house for some other end. 
The most important restriction on the duty imposed on offenders is that 
any cost that the offender is compelled to bear must be proportionate to the 
end sought. For example, if D kills one of V’s children, it is plausible that V 
can kill D as a means to protect another of V’s children if that is the only 
way to protect the second child. This is so in virtue of the stringent protective 
duty that D incurs to V, and to V’s child. This does not imply that it would 
be permissible for V to kill D for fun, or to use D’s skin to make a handbag, 
for the harm imposed on D would be disproportionate to the good of having 
fun or getting a handbag. Hence, if the victim has a right to decide how the 
duty that the offender owes to her is satisfied, she has a right to decide only 
within a certain range of goods that are sufficiently important to justify the 
harm imposed on the offender. 
Now, there might be some circumstances in which the victim does have 
a right to decide, and the state would act wrongly in making the decision 
for her. For example, suppose that both V and X, who is V’s husband, are now 
threatened with death. D can be used as a means to protect either V or X 
but not both. It is plausible that V is permitted to determine whether to use 
D to protect V or to protect X. It follows that it would be wrong for the state 
to use D to protect V if V would prefer that X be protected. Needless to say, 
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though, the fact that it would be wrong, in these circumstances, for the state 
to decide for the victim does not militate powerfully against DV, for these 
circumstances very rarely arise.
It is also worth noting that the state does sometimes give the victim 
control over how the offender’s duties are satisfied. For example, it is 
common in restorative justice programs to provide the victim with an 
opportunity to decide what the offender should do in response to having 
offended. Within some limited range of options, this will sometimes be 
appropriate.
In determining whether the state or the victim ought to decide how D’s 
duty is satisfied, we must also bear in mind a number of other factors that 
count against victims making decisions. First, if victims are entitled to make 
decisions about how the offender’s duty is satisfied, they will be at risk of 
coercion from offenders.6 Secondly, victims, who will often feel resentment 
towards offenders, may be inclined to seek retribution by imposing heavier 
costs on offenders than necessary. Thirdly, the victim owes duties to other 
citizens, including protective duties, and she may be required to select a 
particular way of satisfying the duty that the offender owes to her because 
this will best satisfy these protective duties.7 Fourthly, if the state punishes 
the offender, certain other values, such as communicative values, can be 
advanced, and this provides some reason for the state uniformly to determine 
how the offender is punished. If the victim does not have a strong reason to 
prefer that the duty that is owed to her is satisfied in one way rather than 
another, it is permissible to ensure that the duty owed to her is satisfied in 
a particular way to advance other values. 
Overall, the idea that the victim should have complete choice over how 
the offender’s duty is morally abhorrent, unrealistic and impractical. Hence, 
the fact that victims typically have a right to determine how the duties owed 
to them are satisfied is not a significant challenge to DV.
3.2 Duties and the Wealthy
The second part of Blumenson’s challenge concerns wealthy offenders. 
There are three features of this challenge that should be separated. One 
question is whether it is plausible that wrongdoers who have taken on 
burdens for the sake of their victims ought nevertheless to be punished. DV 
implies that if these burdens are sufficiently large they ought not to be. A second 
question concerns the relationship between punishment and compensation. 
6 See, also, the discussion concerning giving the victim control over prosecution 
decisions in Tadros 2011a: 296. 
7 See Tadros 2011a: 297-9.
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Does DV deny the victim the right to seek monetary compensation from her 
offender? A third question is whether DV has plausible implications for the 
punishment of the wealthy, who may have the means to provide a great deal 
of protection to others at little cost to themselves.
To assess the first question, suppose that V is attacked by a gang, including 
D, X, Y and Z. D assaults V. Let us suppose that it would have been permissible 
to harm D as a means to avert this threat, harming him to degree x. If the 
harm that D does to V is large, x will be even larger. This is for the reason 
that it is generally permissible to harm a person to avert a threat that they 
culpably pose, even if the harm that is necessary to avert the threat is greater 
than the harm that the person would do if the threat they pose were realized. 
D then realizes that what he did was wrong. V still faces a threat from X, Y 
and Z. D, recognizing the duty that he owes to V, now protects V against X, 
Y and Z. He is harmed to degree x in the process. 
Blumenson implies that the state nevertheless ought to punish D. This 
seems wrong. D has borne a great cost in order to protect V against X, Y and 
Z. It is wrong to harm D even more for punitive reasons. The idea that we 
should punish people who have already voluntarily borne great costs for the 
sake of their victims fails adequately to acknowledge the idea that people 
can redeem themselves for their wrongdoing through their voluntary actions.
In response to Blumenson’s second challenge, there is nothing in DV that 
rules out the provision of monetary compensation to victims where monetary 
compensation is available, and can help to ameliorate the victim’s loss. In 
evaluating the comparative merits of a compensation scheme against a 
punitive scheme, we ought not simply to consider what would be beneficial 
to individual victims where most offenders are punished. We ought to 
consider the circumstances of victims were no one punished. In a system 
where compensation was the only available remedy for theft, for example, 
people would be very insecure in their property. In those circumstances, a 
compensatory scheme would be wholly inadequate to secure property rights. 
Hence, there would be powerful reasons to criminalize theft. Nevertheless, 
even if theft is criminalized, victims may seek monetary compensation from 
offenders.
To explain why this is so, notice the following feature of DV. Obligations 
to compensate others are subject to two constraints – a constraint on the 
maximum amount of harm that can be imposed on the wrongdoer (what I 
have called the maximum harm threshold) and a constraint on the maximum 
amount of benefit that can be secured from the wrongdoer (the maximum 
benefit threshold). DV accepts that there is a maximum harm threshold beyond 
which the offender may not be harmed, though not a maximum benefit 
threshold. Below the former threshold, we must consider how the offender 
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is to be harmed, and for whose benefit. Harm may be imposed on the 
offender to provide monetary compensation to the victim, to deter, or a 
combination of the two. This has the attraction that it limits the overall 
harm that an offender suffers as a result of his wrongdoing. If the offender 
provides compensation to the victim, and this is very burdensome to him, 
the amount that he may be punished is reduced. 
Blumenson’s claim that, according to DV, offenders who are punished 
owe no compensation to their victim is thus false. That depends on how 
much the offender is punished. It is true that if an offender is punished up 
to the maximum harm threshold, he may not be harmed further to compensate 
the victim. But this is an attractive implication of DV. If, though, the offender is 
punished to some degree less than the maximum harm threshold, compensation 
may be extracted from him for the victim’s sake. Given that the victim will 
typically have been rendered much worse off than she would have been by 
the offenders action, there is good reason to ensure that we should aim to 
improve the victim’s circumstances. The question is how best to do this. 
The third feature of Blumenson’s challenge concerns the way in which 
we should respond to the greater protective resources available to the wealthy. 
As I have said a great deal about this elsewhere, I will make my comments brief.
In compensatory justice, the maximum benefit threshold is normally set 
at the level of full compensation. It is contested how full compensation should 
be understood,8 but in standard cases, if the wrongdoer has rendered the 
victim as well off as she would have been had the wrongdoer not wrongfully 
harmed her, he has fully compensated her. 
The maximum harm threshold implies that there is a limit to how much 
the wrongdoer may be harmed in order to provide the victim with full 
compensation. If full compensation to the victim would require us to harm 
the wrongdoer a great deal, it is impermissible to extract full compensation 
from the wrongdoer. 
With respect to serious wrongdoing, whilst there is a maximum harm 
threshold, there is no maximum benefit threshold. Wrongdoers cannot satisfy 
the duties incurred through wrongdoing simply by providing full compensation 
to victims. If the provision of full compensation is not onerous, they can be 
expected to do more to protect the victim, and perhaps to protect others. 
Given this, the fact that the wealthy can provide a great deal of protection 
to victims at little cost does not imply that they may not be punished to produce 
further protection if they provide this level of protection.9 
8 I discuss this further in Tadros 2014a.
9 For further defence of this view, demonstrating how it comes apart from retributivism, 
see, Tadros 2011a: 286-91; 2012: 99-102; 2013: 300-9.
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Blumenson, I think, agrees with this verdict, but thinks that this is 
tantamount to a form of negative retributivism. This is false. First, the scope 
and stringency of the duties that we owe in virtue of wrongdoing are not, in 
general, best explained by desert. When we act wrongly, we incur duties. 
We do not incur them because we deserve to incur them. Of course, we should 
explain why we have these duties – for example, because we can redeem 
ourselves by responding appropriately to our wrongdoing, or because we 
could have avoided having them, or some other explanation. It is difficult 
to see how desert claims figure in an explanation of the duties that we incur. 
Of course, we could define retributivism in a way that corresponds to the 
duties that we incur through wrongdoing. We could simply claim that when 
a person incurs a stringent duty in virtue of having wrongdoing, that just is 
her getting what she deserves. But if the retributivist claims this, she just 
accepts DV, but mangles the terminology.
Now, Blumenson looks for an explanation why serious wrongdoers 
cannot satisfy their duties simply by providing full compensation to their 
victims. He complains that my defence of this is vague. I agree that there is 
more to say about this issue than I said in Ends. There I noted the fact that 
it is implausible that the duties of serious wrongdoers are satisfied when 
full compensation is provided, and gave an explanation for this by considering 
complaints that wrongdoers and victims could make to the scope of these 
duties. I also showed that the view that I endorse is intuitive in protection 
cases such as Three Threats. I have since done more to explain this idea, and I 
will say no more about it here.
But whatever the merits of my explanation, Blumenson’s reference to desert 
does nothing to help. It is simply a bad redescription of the idea that wrongdoers 
incur stringent duties that are not satisfied by providing victims with full 
compensation. It does nothing at all to explain the source of these duties. 
The explanation that I provided in Ends may have been vague and incomplete. 
Blumenson offers no explanation at all. 
4. EMPIRICAL SUPPORT
DV justifies punishment only if punishment is effective in deterring crime. 
I am poorly placed to do the empirical work to that is necessary to determine 
whether it is effective, and in which circumstances. This is partly due to my 
lack of empirical skills. It is also due to the fact that the empirical work could 
not realistically be done. What would be required would be a study that 
compares reasonably just large-scale liberal societies with and without 
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systems of punishment. But there is no reasonably just large-scale liberal 
society without a system of punishment. The question is whether dismantling 
a system of punishment and replacing it with some intrinsically better 
alternative would be detrimental to the crime rate. If it would not be 
detrimental to the crime rate, our system of punishment is unjustified.10
The fact that DV justifies punishment only contingently on it being 
effective in deterring crime and on it not having disproportionate bad side 
effects is no objection to it. Any sensible theory of punishment is contingent 
in this way. Any system of state punishment is enormously costly. It will harm 
not only offenders, but innocent people as well. These costs need to be 
justified. The idea that they can be justified by anything other than crime 
reduction is implausible. Even if it is true, as retributivists claim, that 
punishment is impersonally valuable, it is very difficult to believe that any 
impersonal value that it has is sufficiently great fully to justify the costs of 
any realistic criminal justice system. If state punishment is ineffective in 
reducing the crime rate, state punishment ought to be abandoned.11
5. PROPORTIONALITY
Blumenson thinks that DV cannot explain why some factors that intuitively 
ought to affect the sentence that we ought to impose on an offender are relevant 
to punishment. I am not sure why he thinks this. Though it is true that I ought 
to have said more about this issue in Ends, it is highly plausible that both a 
person’s duties to avert the threats that he poses and the strength of the 
duties he incurs through his wrongdoing depend on the kinds of factors 
that Blumenson outlines as relevant to punishment. 
Furthermore, retributivism seems to me less well placed to explain these 
factors. Blumenson rightly claim that retributivists typically think that 
punishment should ref lect the gravity of the crime and the offender’s 
blameworthiness for it. What they lack is an explanation why this is so. 
There is little reason to think that, on the best view of desert, what we deserve 
is determined by the properties of our actions. It is more plausible to think 
that what we deserve depends on our virtues and vices.12 But this more 
plausible view of desert has troubling implications for a theory of punishment.
Retributivists typically tailor their theory of desert to provide plausible 
10  For further discussion, see Tadros 2012: 91-3.
11  For a compelling argument for this view, see Husak 2010.
12 See, further, Tadros 2011a, ch.4.II. It is not uncommon for friends of desert in moral 
philosophy to think that virtue and vice over a whole life is the proper desert basis. See, for 
example, Kagan 2012: 6-12.
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implications for punishment. But if so, their justification of punishment is 
unsatisfactory. It is no good to begin from a conventional view about what 
punishment ought to be imposed for which crimes under which circumstances 
and justify this conventional view simply on the basis that doing what we 
do is impersonally valuable. What is needed is an independent argument 
that shows that desert explains why punishment should fit the gravity of 
crimes and blameworthiness for them. Such arguments are hard to find, 
and Blumenson offers none.
Blumenson is also wrong to think that the necessity constraint on self-
defence creates problems for the relationship between self-defence and 
punishment outlined in Ends. I will restrict myself to an evaluation of 
Blumenson’s first case, as I think this the most interesting:
Unnecessary Defence. A threatens V with a knife. V is able to retreat 
safely and therefore defensive force is unnecessary; but V fails to retreat, 
parries A’s thrust unsuccessfully, and dies. 
As harming A was not necessary to avert the threat he poses, it might be 
argued that A is not liable to defensive harm. Blumenson then concludes 
that DV implies that he is also not liable to be punished. This argument is 
much too quick. 
First, it is not clear that A is not liable to defensive harm. It is a matter of 
dispute whether harming A wrongs him where harming him is unnecessary.13 
I am inclined to the view that V wrongs A if V unnecessarily harms A. But this 
does not imply that A incurs no duties as a result of wrongfully killing V. The 
fact that V wrongly chose to attempt to harm A rather than retreating does not 
vitiate the duties that A incurs for wrongfully harming V. 
It is also false that A is not liable to defensive harm to avert the threat 
that he later poses in Unnecessary Defence.14 To see this, consider a variation 
on Unnecessary Defence where X, a third party, could intervene after V 
attempts to parry A’s thrust to avert the threat that A poses to V. If X harms 
A to avert the threat that he poses, X does not wrong A. Although V acts 
wrongly in attempting unnecessarily to harm A, this does not vitiate A’s 
liability for threat that he later poses.15 
Furthermore, whilst it is true that, if V successfully harms A in Unnecessary 
Defence, V wrongs A, it is false that it is wrong for V to harm A given that V 
13 For some discussion, see, for example, McMahan 2009; Firth and Quong 2012; 
Frowe 2014. 
14 Blumenson also considers the problem of criminal attempts and the significance 
of intentions to punishment. I say more about these issues in Tadros 2013: 313-22, so I leave 
them aside here.
15 For related discussion, see further Tadros 2014b.
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has decided to stand his ground rather than to retreat. Suppose that V stands 
his ground. Suppose, also, that by standing his ground he gives up the 
opportunity that he had to retreat. He must now decide whether to harm A, 
parrying the blow that A aims at him, or to allow himself to be harmed by 
A. He may recognize that he was wrong to stand his ground, but this does 
not vitiate his permission to harm A. He wrongs A in virtue of the fact that 
he had another option which rendered his defensive force unnecessary. 
But despite the fact that the existence of this option renders his defensive 
harm wrongful, given his wrongful act he is permitted to defend himself. It 
follows that there is no asymmetry between liability in self-defense and 
liability in punishment of the kind that Blumenson’s argument relies on.
CONCLUSION
Obviously, there is a great deal more that would need to be done fully to 
meet Blumenson’s interesting and important objections to the arguments 
in Ends than I have done here. I hope, at least, to have shown that some of 
Blumenson’s objections can either be met by clarifying DV, or by showing 
that the seemingly counterintuitive implications of DV are more attractive 
than he thinks. DV is a new theory of punishment. I do not claim to have 
worked out all of the details of the theory in Ends. I continue to think that 
it has a great deal of promise, despite the powerful objections that have been 
mounted against it.
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